JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Learning-by-doing and increasing returns are often perceived to have similar implications for market structure and conduct. We analyse this in the context of an infinite-horizon price-setting game. Learning is shown to not reduce the viability of market-sharing collusion between a given number of firms, whereas intra-period increasing returns invariably does. We subsequently develop a model where the number of active firms is determined endogenously, under the assumption that the post-entry game is collusive. In this model, learning has no effect on concentration, while scale economies increase concentration.
1. There are other ways of describing learning-by-doing, such as the effects of cumulated investment on current costs (see e.g. Arrow (1962) and Sheshinski (1967) ). But cumulated output appears to be the more widely used (see e.g. the discussion in Lieberman (1982) ) and we follow this approach. Similarly, returns to scale can be conceptualized on dimensions other than reduction in unit costs (see Scherer (1980) ), but we ignore these in this paper. 993 strategy of vigorous price-cutting as a competitive weapon intended to achieve market dominance.2
These propositions have not, however, found strong empirical support. For instance, in the context of chemical processing industries, Lieberman's (1982 Lieberman's ( , 1989 analysis revealed no systematic relationship between the extent of learning and industry concentration, whereas large fixed costs tended to be associated with greater concentration. Baldwin and Krugman (1987a, b) found that the market for 16K RAM chips was significantly less concentrated than would be predicted by a theory which equated the role of learning with increasing returns. Recent management literature has also attacked the orthodox view that early output expansion would deter entry: firms using this strategy were failing to achieve the market dominance that had been hoped for (see Kiechel (1981) , Day and Montgomery (1983) and Porter (1980) ). Explanations of these anomalies have been sought in the presence of additional considerations such as the degree of learning spillovers (e.g. Ghemawat and Spence (1985) and Lieberman (1989) ), or the nature of commitments that firms entered into (Baldwin and Krugman (1987a) ).
Strategic models predicting a close similarity between learning-by-doing and increasing returns usually assume non-cooperative behaviour among active firms. For instance, Spence (1981) assumes a finite horizon, thereby precluding the possibility of collusion among firms entering a market. This is a common feature of most models of entry. The assumption is often justified by considerations of tractability, since equilibrium selection problems can be avoided in many finite-horizon games. Nevertheless, there is some empirical evidence suggesting the inappropriateness of this assumption. For example, in the context of markets for automobile dealership, Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) find that entering firms tend to collude with incumbents, and that the inability of incumbents to preclude such collusion perhaps explains the lack of significant entry barriers.
In this paper, we explore the implications of the alternative assumption that firms participate in an infinite-horizon price-setting game. Such contexts may enable tacit collusion among active firms. Our aim is to investigate the extent to which learning-bydoing or increasing returns facilitate collusion among a given set of firms that share a given market, and the resulting implications for industry concentration when entrants expect to collude subsequent to entry.
In Section 2 of the paper, we start by considering the question whether learning facilitates or impedes the ease with which a given number of firms can collude in setting prices. In this section, we suppose that there are no intra-period increasing returns, and concentrate exclusively on the effects of learning. We focus on forms of collusion where firms share a market equally at all dates by coordinating on a common price sequence.
It turns out that in a variety of senses, the presence of learning-by-doing has no effect whatsoever on the ability of a given number of firms to sustain such forms of collusion as self-enforcing agreements (in the sense of constituting perfect equilibrium outcomes).
For instance, if firms are identical to start, with, or if demand is perfectly inelastic up to some reservation price (as in the case of auctions of procurement contracts), the nature of the learning curve does not affect their ability to sustain collusive price paths that are Pareto optimal (from the point of view of the colluding firms). In particular, Proposition 3 establishes that if the discount factor 8 is less than 1 -(1/n), where n is the number of firms, then no profitable price path can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome. On the other hand, if 8 is at least 1 -(1/n), the Pareto-optimal price path (i.e. that which maximizes a weighted sum of the present value profits of the n firms) can be 2. For a survey of this literature, as well as of related empirical work, see Mookherjee and Ray (1989) . sustained as a perfect equilibrium outcome. The maximal degree of collusion that can be supported thus has a strikingly simple form that depends solely on the discount factor and the number of firms. In addition, Proposition 4 shows that a large class of price paths can be sustained in the presence of learning if and only if they can be sustained in the corresponding no-learning world.
We subsequently explore the implications of these results for endogenous determination of the number of active firms in the industry. It is assumed that firms enter in the expectation of earning collusive post-entry profits, and that a cartel of active firms is constrained to coordinate on a price path that is not only invulnerable to the incentives of member firms, but also of passive non-member firms, to undercut the cartel price at any date. In the absence of sunk entry costs, this may be viewed as an extension of the notion of a contestable market to a collusive setting. Under conditions similar to Proposition 3, equilibrium concentration turns out to depend only on the discount factor, and in particular is independent of the nature of the learning curve. Learning, however, allows active firms to earn profits by "limit-pricing" non-active firms: the extent of industry profits thus depend on the speed of learning.
Section 3 proceeds to examine the effect of intra-period increasing returns on price collusion. We find these effects to be substantially different from those of learning-bydoing: increasing returns always makes collusion more difficult. The reason is the following. The presence of intra-period increasing returns expands the immediate profits of a firm that undercuts a collusive price, since such a deviation increases current output and thereby lowers current unit costs. This increases the incentive of any given firm to deviate from a collusive price, thereby restricting the range of sustainable collusive price paths. The crucial contrast with learning-by-doing is that with learning, an expansion in current output leads to a fall in future rather than current unit costs. By the time the cost reduction occurs, other firms have the opportunity to retaliate and punish the deviant firm suitably; the cost reduction thereby does not augment the profit from such a deviation.
Finally, Section 4 concludes with some suggestions for future research.
PURE LEARNING-BY-DOING

2A. A given number of firms
There are a given number of firms n ?2, which produce and market a homogenous good.
These firms compete in prices on a product market. Each firm is subject to a common learning curve c(N). This defines the unit cost of firm i at date t as a function of its accumulated experience N' which is given by N,= N'+E Y,o Q', where Q' denotes the output of firm i at date s, and No its given level of initial experience. In this section we deal with the case of pure learning-by-doing, by abstracting from the presence of intraperiod scale economies (reflected in the assumption that the current unit cost is independent of the current scale of production).
We impose the following assumptions on the nature of the learning curve: Assumption 1. c(ND) is strictly decreasing and continuous, with c(oo) >O.
The demand function for the product is given by D(p), where p denotes the price to be paid by the buyer(s). We assume that this function satisfies the following property.
3. The assumption that c is strictly decreasing can be weakened to allow c to be weakly decreasing, without altering the main results. The case of constant returns with no learning is thus a special case of our theory. Only Proposition 5 relating to industry concentration does not apply, and the case of no learning is discussed separately there. Firms participate in an infinite-horizon price-setting game, where experience levels evolve endogenously. For a given time-path of price quotations -t = (p I, ... I, p'), fi earns a profit of H(it, Ni) at date t, where Nt =-No+2 Y= Qi(p-s). All firms are assu to use the same discount factor 8 which is less than 1, so present value profits for i from date k onwards along the price path -t is given by W k Psk Si(fi ND.
Throughout this paper, we restrict attention to collusive (market-sharing) price paths (CPP) Pt where (i) all n firms share the market by quoting the common price Pt at date t, i.e. p't = Pt for all i and all t, and (ii) the present value of profits (for every firm from The first question to be addressed is: what is the class of CPP's that are the outcomes of some subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the infinite-horizon price-setting game played by the n firms?4 If firm i is to increase its profit at any date t, it must undercut the collusive price Pt and capture the entire market for itself at that date. The maximal profits that it can earn at t is then given by
For the CPP Pt to be a SPE outcome, it must be the case that d(pt, Ni) _Z a 8s ? t r(ps, ND) for all t and i. (2.1) That is, the single-period-deviation profit cannot exceed the present value profit to firm i from continuing to abide by the collusive agreement. If this condition were not satisfied then firm i could do better for itself by deviating from the collusive agreement at t, and then shutting down production from t + 1 onwards. Clearly, (2.1) is a necessary condition for the CPP Pt to be a SPE outcome. The question then arises whether it is also sufficient: the following Proposition answers this in the affirmative. Proposition 1. A necessary and sufficient condition for a CPPpt to be a SPE outcome is that (2.1) holds.
This follows from the result that subsequent to a deviation by any firm i at any date t, there exists a continuation equilibrium set of strategies for the n firms that generates notion of optimality is the following. An unconstrained Pareto-optimal collusive price path p* is obtained by maximizing a convex combination of the present-value profits of the n colluding firms:
for some set of weights Ai 0, -2=1 Ai = 1. Of course, the unc price path may not be supportable as a SPE outcome: the corresponding constrained Pareto-optimal price path is obtained by solving (2.4) subject to the constraint that Pt satisfies (2.1).
The following question may now be posed: how does the MDF associated with the unconstrained Pareto-optimal price path depend on the learning curve? We start by considering environments where there is unanimity among different firms regarding which collusive path should be followed, i.e. the unconstrained Pareto-optimal CPP is independent of the weights Ai on the profits of different firms. Then the minimal discount factor associated with an unconstrained Pareto-optimal collusive price path is equal to 1 -(1/n), i.e. is independent of the learning curve (as well as initial experience levels, or the market demand function).
Proof. Given the result of Proposition 2, it suffices to show that if either (a) or (b) hold, then 8?-1-(1/n) implies that any unconstrained Pareto-optimal price path can be supported as a SPE outcome.
(a) If all firms have identical initial experience No, and share markets at every da then they have identical experience at every date. Hence every unconstrained Paretooptimal price path p* maximizes
Since the stationary policy ps = p m for s '-t is a candidate policy from t onwards in problem (2.5), it follows that (using c(N*)-? c(N*) for all s '-t) V(N*)---E 00 t as-t[ps* -c(Ns*)]D(ps*)
given that 8 _ 1-1/ n. Hence, if the best-deviation profits are non-negative at t, no firm will wish to deviate from the unconstrained optimum at t. The same is true if the best-deviation profits are negative, because V(N*) 0 for all t.
(b) In the case of an auction, unconstrained Pareto-optimality requires charging buyers their reservation price q in every period, since any lower price results in lower revenues without contributing to future profits by increasing the amount of learning. Hence p* = q for all t. Also, the maximal deviation profit for a firm i with experience N, equals n-r(q, N,), while the present value of continuing with the collusive path is equal to ES= 8 (q, S)-(q,_Na the inequality following from the existence of learning effects. Hence the Pareto-optimal path satisfies (2.1) if 8 -1 -(1/n). 11
Under the conditions of Proposition 3, the ability of the cartel to sustain collusive outcomes depends rather simply on the discount factor and the number of firms. If 8<1-(1/n) then by Proposition 2 no collusive price path can be supported as a SPE outcome. On the other hand if 8 > 1 -(1/n), then the unconstrained Pareto-optimal path can be supported: in this case the unconstrained and constrained optimal paths coincide. The condition for the sustainability of optimal collusion is completely independent of the learning curve. In this sense, the presence of learning provides no impediment to price collusion at all.
To provide intuition for this result, consider first the benchmark case where there is no learning-by-doing, i.e. unit costs are independent of experience levels. Here the result can be explained as follows. Under either conditions (a) or (b), the optimal price path from the point of view of any of the colluding firms involves the stationary price which maximizes the per-period profit of a monopolist. Hence any participating firm seeking to undercut this price in any period will shade its price just enough to capture the entire market at that date. Given the absence of scale economies, the maximal deviation profit is n times its collusive market-sharing profit 7r* in any given period. Since the present value of its collusive market-sharing profit is iT*/(1 -8), it follows that the unconstrained optimal collusive path can be sustained if and only if 8 ' 1 -(1/n).
With the introduction of learning effects, the sustainability of optimal collusion is, if anything, strengthened. We have noted above that in the absence of learning, collusive payoffs outweigh deviation profits whenever 8 exceeds 1 -(1/ n). The presence of learning further decreases the temptation to undercut the collusive price: since future costs are lower relative to current costs, future profits from collusion are increased relative to current deviation profits. So 8 > 1 -(1/n) continues to ensure sustainability of the maximally collusive path.5
The restriction of identical initial experiences, or of an auction in Proposition 3, serves to ensure that there is unanimous agreement among the firms about the optimal collusive price path. It can be shown that in the absence of such unanimity, the result may fail to be true: i.e. 8 ' 1 -(1/n) does not imply that unconstrained Pareto-optimal paths can be supported as SPE outcomes. However, this is equally true for both environments with and without learning.
To say something about the effect of learning on collusion in such contexts, we may examine how learning affects the supportability of a given collusive price path. For instance, is a (given) price path easier or harder to support in the presence of learning? To answer this question, we first need to settle on the appropriate benchmark cost leve 5. Note that 8 '-1 -(1/n) continues to be necessary since the accumulation of sufficient experience lead learning effects to vanish, so that the environment "converges" eventually to a no-learning constant cost environment (where 8 has to be at least 1 -(1/n) to ensure sustainability of collusion).
for the no-learning environment to compare with a given learning environment. The reason is that the supportability of a given price sequence in a constant returns no-learning world depends on the level of unit costs. For instance, a stationary price is more difficult to support in a constant returns world, the lower the unit cost is: if i(p, c) denotes per-period collusive profit of a firm with cost c from a price p, and ITM(p, c) its max deviation profit, then the reader may verify that the ratio of collusive to deviation profit i(p, c)/TM (p, c) is non-decreasing in c. Since with the passage of time, every learning curve will eventually converge to some asymptotic level of unit cost, it follows that if we compare two learning environments with differing asymptotic cost levels, the set of supportable collusive paths will necessarily differ. Hence it is natural to compare a learning environment with a no-learning environment with identical asymptotic cost levels.
The following proposition considers a class of collusive price paths which includes all paths where prices are stationary or non-decreasing over time.
Proposition 4. Consider any collusive price path p, with the property that for every fir i, the associated sequence of price-cost margins [p, -c(N9)] is non-decreasing over tim Then this price path is a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcome in the presence of the learning curve c( * ) whenever it is a SPE outcome in an environment without learning (where every firm has a constant unit cost level equal to c(oo)). However, the converse is not always true.
Proof If pt is supportable as a SPE outcome in the no-learning world, then for any To show that the converse is not true, consider an auction where a CPP pt is supportable in a world with learning, so for all t and i: pt -ct _ 1/n E=, BS-t(psSuppose that pt is decreasing, while (pt -c,) is increasing in t. Then pt is viable in the world with learning at any ?_1-(1/n), but with =1-(1/n) it is not viable in the world without learning (since (Pt -c.) is decreasing). 11
In the presence of learning, any non-decreasing price path will generate a nondecreasing sequence of price-cost margins for every firm. The above Proposition shows that (having fixed the asymptotic level of unit costs) the presence of a learning curve does not make it more difficult for such price paths to be supported as equilibrium outcomes.6 The proof also makes it clear that the result holds even if different firms have different learning curves.
The result follows essentially from two effects: (i) as mentioned above, learning causes future costs to be lower than curent costs, thereby increasing collusive profits which accrue mainly in future periods, relative to the deviation profit which accrues only in the current period; (ii) learning causes the general level of costs to be lower for more experienced firms, which are more tempted to undercut a given collusive price than firms with higher costs. Hence the sustainability constraints in (2.1) that bind apply for firms with the greatest experience, for whom learning effects have been exhausted. They are identical to the supportability constraints in the benchmark no-learning world.
We finally mention another related result (established in an earlier version of this paper (Mookherjee-Ray (1987) ) that demonstrates the irrelevance of the speed of learning in sustaining collusion. If a stationary collusive price can be supported as a SPE outcome with a given learning curve, it can also be supported in the presence of any other learning curve that converges to the same asymptotic cost. Put differently, the minimal discount factor associated with any such collusive path is independent of the nature of the learning curve or the pattern of initial experience levels. For a non-decreasing sequence, the same is true if the revenue function R( p) = pD( p) is concave.
2B. An endogenous number of firms
We now describe implications of the foregoing results for industry concentration, under the assumption that active firms collude in setting prices, and that potential firms make entry decisions under optimistic conjectures of collusive profits subsequent to entry. Of course, forms of collusion that are feasible must respect incentive constraints elaborated below.
We restrict attention to a "free entry" environment with an infinity of potential firms that do not need to incur any sunk costs to enter; extension to the case of positive sunk costs is straightforward. Collusion betwen a cartel of active firms is constrained by two factors: (i) Internal stability: No member firm should have an incentive to undercut the 6. If price-cost margins are decreasing over time, then the result does not extend: for an example see Mookherjee-Ray (1987) . collusive price at any date, and (ii) External stability: No non-member firms should be able to earn positive profit by undercutting the cartel price at any date.7
Let the set of potential firms be denoted by I = {1, 2, . . .}. For any finite subset J of I, a price path p, is said to be a collusive price path (CPP) for J if market-sharing by members of J (i.e. with firms in I -J inactive at all dates) according to the price path p, would yield every member of J a positive present-value profit from every date onwards.
It is said to be a subgame-perfect (SPE) outcome for J if the path p, can be sustained as a SPE outcome of the game played between members of J alone.
A finite subset J of I is said to be a viable cartel if there exists a price sequence p, which is a CPP for J satisfying the following two conditions: (i) if J contains two or more firms, then p, is a SPE outcome for J, and (ii) p, ' c(N') for all ikZ?J and Condition (i) represents the criterion of internal stability, and (ii) of external stability.
Finally, J is said to be an equilibrium cartel if J is a viable cartel, but J u {i} is not a viable cartel for any iyiJ. That is, while J has available to it a collusive price path that is stable with respect to the incentives of both members and non-members, the same is not true when the cartel is augmented to include an additional member.
In the following Proposition, we use [x] to denote the largest integer less than or equal to a real number x. Also, we use m to denote the maximal size of a cartel for which there exists a collusive price path satisfying pt c c(NO). The value of m can be calculated from the underlying demand function and the learning curve. The result relies on the existence of learning effects, as embodied in Assumption 1.
These learning effects allow active firms to earn positive profits, despite the threat of entry: the profits arise from the cost advantage resulting from experience accumulated by active firms. While equilibrium concentration is independent of the learning curve, the profitability of active firms does depend on the nature of learning.
In the more usual sense of measuring the extent of entry deterrence by equilibrium concentration levels, learning thus does not serve as an entry barrier at all. This runs counter to the results of Spence (1981) , or those obtained from formulating the post-entry game to be a finite-horizon non-cooperative one. Even if all firms did not have identical levels of initial experience (e.g. if one firm managed to lower its costs relative to other potential entrants by arriving earlier in the market and selling large quantities in order to climb down the learning curve), the argument of Proposition 5 can be extended under relatively weak conditions.9
In the absence of any learning effects, no active firm can earn any positive profit.10
To earn profit, a firm will have to sell at a price above the common level of unit cost, in which case a non-active firm would have an incentive to enter the market and undercut the going price. Given that active firms earn zero profits and there are constant returns to scale, the equilibrium number of firms is indeterminate.
INCREASING RETURNS
We now modify the model of the preceding section to accommodate intra-period scale economies. Start by considering a given number (n '2) of firms. Assumption (1) With these definitions, it can be shown that Propositions 1 and 2 extend to this context (while the latter is straightforward, the former is discussed in the Appendix.)
In contrast to learning-by-doing, we shall argue that increasing returns necessarily makes collusion between a given number of firms more difficult to support as a selfenforcing agreement. Proposition 3 showed that with learning, the minimal discount factor required to sustain optimal collusive price paths equals 1 -(1/ n) in many circumstances, which is precisely the minimal discount factor in a comparable world without learning. We now establish that the presence of intra-period scale economies implies that the minimal discount factor associated with any collusive price path is strictly higher than this value.
Proposition 6. Assume Assumptions 1' and 2. The minimal discount factor required to sustain any collusive price path pt is strictly greater than 1 -1/ n. The intuition for this result is simple. A deviation by any firm from a enables it to capture the entire market, rather than serve a fraction of it. in scale of output leads to a fall in unit costs, in the presence of increasing the profits from deviating are expanded, relative to collusive profits, and f tempted to undercut. An explicit lower bound on the minimum discount fa to support a stationary price p is
which clearly illustrates the role of increasing returns. Note th structure of increasing returns: the scale economies must be int an expansion of output in any period must lead to a fall in unit If on the other hand, they cause unit costs to fall in future of learning-by-doing, which has already been demonstrated not of collusion. The reason is that a deviation by a firm in any deviation profits relative to collusive profits, only when the dev unit costs. If the fall in unit costs is to be realized in future the deviating firm can obtain no benefit, because other firms will have had the time to respond and punish the deviating firm by reverting to a relatively unprofitable equilibrium. It is the inability of other firms to respond to a deviation in the same period, that causes increasing returns to hamper the sustainability of collusion.11
The model of endogenous concentration described in the previous section can also be extended to the case of increasing returns. Only the condition for external stability needs to be modified as follows. Define p*(Ni) = finf {p jp> c(N, D(p))} if this set is nonempty, o00 otherwise.
11. However, this result is partly du at every date. If they "rotate" bids and well make collusion easier, by exploit Then if i is a non-member of a cartel J choosing a collusive price p at any date t, then i can profitably undercut pt. Hence external st pt for the cartel J requires that Pt-p*(Ni) forall tandforall ijJ.
Equilibrium cartels generally exist. Suppose that there are pure increasing returns, i.e. learning effects are absent (unit costs depend only on current output). If all firms have access to identical technologies, then no active firm can earn positive profit. If one firm owns a technology more efficient than the rest, this firm can earn positive profit. In either case, the presence of increasing returns implies that there cannot be more than one active firm, as any market-sharing price can be profitably undercut by a potential entrant. This is the case of a natural monopoly.12
Note that while increasing returns causes the industry to be concentrated, active firms may not be able to earn any profit due to the threat of entry. This is in sharp contrast with the effect of learning, which has no effect on industry concentration, but allows active firms to earn positive profits.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
We suggest three directions for future research. First, our analysis has restricted attention to the class of subgame-perfect equilibria. It will be interesting to explore how the results are affected by the use of alternative equilibrium concepts. For instance, one could analyse the class of Markov equilibra where firms condition their strategies only upon the current vector of experience levels, rather than the entire history of past strategy choices. Alternatively, one could examine subgame-perfect equilibria that are renegotiation-proof in some sense.'3 Secondly, it will be interesting to examine contexts with user externalities, e.g. where different firms offer differentiated products, and the utility of purchasing one product for any user increases with the number of other users purchasing the same product (see, for example, Shapiro (1985, 1986) ). This gives firms who have succeeded in selling to more customers in the past a potential advantage over other firms. The size of past clienteles then plays the role of a state variable, rather than the volume of accumulated experience in the case of learning-by-doing.
Finally, a number of authors have stressed that the speed of learning should not be treated as exogenous, but rather something that depends on market structure in turn. For instance, firms facing greater competition on the product market may be motivated to undertake cost-reducing investments. The two-way interaction between learning and market structure deserves more attention.
APPENDIX
Here we discuss the argument underlying the proof of Proposition 1. The Proposition requires that given a CPP satisfying (2.1), any deviating firm can be punished by reverting to a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which this firm earns a profit stream with a present value equal to zero. This result is established in a previous version of this paper: for any 8 e (0, 1), and any vector of initial experience levels, there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium giving each firm an infinite-horizon payoff of zero.
12. It is possible, however, that there are two firms with access to the "most efficient technology" that form an equilibrium cartel by sharing the market, where the technology owned by all other firms is relatively so inefficient that none of them can profitably capture the market by undercutting the cartel price.
13. For a discussion of alternative concepts of renegotiation-proof equilibria in the context of repeated games, see Bernheim and Ray (1989) and Farrell and Maskin (1989) .
We do not prove this result here, for two reasons: (a) the equilibrium constructed in the proof is somewhat implausible, and (b) an alternative approach manages to avoid these difficulties and yet yield a similar result.
To explain this alternative approach, we first briefly discuss some of the difficulties with the former approach.
The basic problem with the proof of the result cited in the previous paragraph is that it relies on the use of dominated strategies by high-cost firms at some stages of the game. The construction of the zero-profit equilibrium is as follows. At the initial date, all but the most experienced firm price slightly below the latter's cost, and require the most experienced firm to quote a still lower price. The latter thus makes negative profits at this date, and no deviation is posible that will earn a positive profit. From the next date onwards, the most experienced firm makes positive profits by "limit-pricing" others; these profits exactly counterbalance the losses at the initial date. All firms thus earn a zero present value profit from this outcome path; subgame perfection is ensured by re-installation of a similar outcome path following any deviation (as described by Abreu (1988) in the context of repeated games). If there is a small chance that the lowest cost firm will "tremble" and choose a sub-optimal price, high-cost firms would be unwilling to employ these pricing strategies.
One kind of equilibrium that would never be prone to this kind of difficulty is what might be called a strict subgame-perfect equilibrium. We define this to be a subgame-perfect equilibrium with the following additional property: for each date and each conceivable history, each firm strictly prefers its own best response to any possible deviation that is feasible at that node of the game. Not only do these involve players choosing undominated strategies at every stage, they are invulnerable to "trembles" or small mistakes on the part of players.
It is well-known for games with finite strategy spaces, strict equilibria satisfy all the standard refinements of Nash equilibrium. In particular, these are invulnerable to any conceivable pattern of "trembles" or small mistakes on the part of players. While the game discussed here is an infinite-horizon version with strategy spaces that are uncountable, a similar stability property should hold for strict equilibria in this case, with respect to a large class of sequences of "trembles" that place vanishingly small probability on actions other than the prescribed one.
We are now going to argue that collusive price paths p, that satisfy the necessary condition for support with strict inequality (8 > 8(p,) ) can be supported as a strict subgame-perfect equilibrium, where 3(p, the minimal discount factor associated with the price path p, (i.e. the minimal value of 8 for which (2.1 satisfied). To establish this, it suffices to construct strict subgame-perfect equilibria in which all firms earn arbitrarily small (but positive) payoffs (a formal proof is provided later in this section). Following any deviation from the collusive arrangement, an equilibrium of this sort can be instituted to punish the deviating firm. The punishment equilibria are characterized by outcome paths with a two-phase structure similar to those introduced by Abreu (1986) . In the first phase, the most experienced firm takes the entire market at its lowest breakeven price, while less experienced firms set a slightly higher price (thereby limiting the maximal deviation profits of the former). Thus all firms earn zero profits in this phase. In the second phase of the punishment, all firms participate in a market-sharing collusive arrangement and receive positive profits. The onset of the second phase is delayed enough so as to sufficiently limit the present value of the profit stream of every firm. Any deviation from this outcome path is followed by re-installation of an analogous outcome path where the deviating firm earns even smaller payoffs.
In the case of pure increasing returns, the game is a repeated one, and the second phase of the punishing outcome path can employ the original collusive path that was meant to be supported. Thus, punishments take the familiar form of a temporary price war, followed by a reversion to collusion. Deviations from prescribed strategies during the price war merely serve to extend the war.
The argument is slightly more complicated in the presence of learning, owing to the fact that the game is not a repeated one as experience levels evolve endogenously. To elaborate on this, it is convenient to make explicit the dependence of the MDF on the vector of initial experience levels. For a CPP p, and initial experien vector N, let the minimal value of 8 that enables (2.1) to be satisfied, be denoted by 8(pt, N) .
An approach similar to that used for the pure increasing returns case can be used if the original collusive path involves a stationary price. With non-stationary paths, however, the complication is the following. Since experience levels evolve during the price war (from N to N, say), the original collusive path (which satisfied 8 > 3(p,, N) ) may no longer satisfy the necessary condition 8 > 8(p", N) for supportability following the price war.
To avoid this problem, we introduce the following additional assumption:
Assumption 3. The stationary price path p, = PM ((X) is a collusive price path for the given set of firms with initial experience vector N, where PM (ro) denotes the monopoly price for a firm with infinite experience. This condition requires stationary collusion at the limit monopoly price to be profitable for the n firms, and can be verified for any given parametric specification of the model. We are now in a position to prove the following result. Proof of Lemma. Since p, is a CPP with initial experience N, the argument of Proposition 2 can to establish that 8(pt, N) ' 1-(1/n). Since 8> 8(pt, N) , it suffices to show that 8(p*, N) = 1-(1/n) for N _ N. Since Assumption 3 ensures that p* is a CPP for experience vector N, it follows that it is also a CPP Now return to the proof of the main Proposition. For simplicity Let NF min (N', N2) and NL = max (N', N2). Call L the leader a family of outcome paths as follows. Consider any N N, and any E > 0. We shall show that there exists an outcome path 0(E, N) such that (i) both agents obtain a payoff on 0(E, N) that is strictly less than e.
(ii) by deviating from 0(E, N) at any date t, each agent obtains strictly less at t, compared to his infinite horizon payoff from t onwards.
Observe that by condition (ii), each agent's payoff on 0(s, N) must be positive. The reader can now check that under the assumption of this proposition, 0(E, N) satisfies conditions (i) and (ii).
We now claim that starting from the experience vector N, any such outcome path is supportable as a strict subgame-perfect equilibrium. For suppose that a deviation from 0(3E, N) occurs at time t. Let N' be the experience vector following the deviation. Define E' to be the difference between the infinite-horizon payoff at time t to the deviating agent, if he had persisted with 0(a, N), and the value of the current return due to the deviation. By condition (ii), E'> 0. At time t + 1, start up the outcome path 0(a', ?N'). Use a similar method of switching to a new path should any deviation occur from N(a', N'). The reader can easily verify that the strategy pair implied by these rules forms a strict subgame-perfect equilibrium.
To complete the proof, consider any collusive price path pt with 8 > 8(pt, N) . Define E by E-infj= , 2; t-, { V(p,, N)-d (p,, N)}. () Because 8 > 8(pt, N) , we have ? > 0. Now suppose that any deviation takes place, with a post-deviation experience vector of N'. Follow up this deviation with the outcome path 0(E, N'). Now use (*) and the fact that 0(E, N') is supportable to conclude that p, is supportable as a strict subgame-perfect equilibrium. 11
